Page 14 - Logical and Spiritual Reflections
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10 LOGICAL REFLECTIONS



When one discovers a contradiction in one’s thinking, it is not logic as such that is put in
doubt but only one’s current thinking. It is silly to cling to a particular thought and reject
logic instead. Hume had greater faith in his particular logical notions (which were not, it
turns out very logical) than he had in logic as such. The true scientist remains humble and
open to correction.
Our ideas and theories have to be, as Karl Popper put it, not only verifiable but also
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falsifiable, to be credible and trustworthy. Albert Einstein likewise remarked :
“The belief in an external world independent of the perceiving subject is the basis
of all natural science. Since, however, sense perception only gives information of
this external world or of “physical reality” indirectly, we can only grasp the latter
by speculative means. It follows from this that our notions of physical reality can
never be final. We must always be ready to change these notions – that is to say, the
axiomatic basis of physics – in order to do justice to perceived facts in the most
perfect way logically.”
If one examines Hume’s actual discourse in his books, one sees that even as he explicitly
denies the reliability of induction he is implicitly using induction to the best of his ability.
That is, he appeals to facts and logic, he conceptualizes, generalizes and proposes theories,
he compares his favored theories to other possible interpretations or explanations, he gives
reasons (observations and arguments) for preferring his theories, and so forth. All that is –
induction. Thus, the very methodology he rejects is the one he uses (albeit imperfectly) –
and that is bound to be the case, for human beings have no other possible methodology.
To say this would seem to suggest that self-contradiction is feasible. Not so, if one
considers how the two aspects, viz. the theory and the practice, may be at odds in the same
person. When Hume says that induction is unreliable, he of course means that induction as
he sees it is unreliable; but he does not realize that he sees it incorrectly , i.e. that a quid
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pro quo is involved. Indeed, he does not seemingly realize that the way he views it affects
the way he gets his views of it, i.e. that he misleads himself too.
While he consciously denies the validity of induction, he unconsciously and
subconsciously naturally continues to use it. However, because he has (prejudicially)
chosen to deny induction in principle, he cannot study it as openly, impartially and
thoroughly as he would otherwise have done, and he is led into error both in his
understanding of it and in his actual use of it. Bad theory generates bad practice. And the
converse is of course also true, wrong practices promote wrong theories. He is trapped in a
vicious circle, which requires a special effort of objectivity to shake off.
We must always keep in mind that what seems impossible or necessary to a philosopher (or
anyone else, for that matter) depends on how he views things more broadly. Every
philosopher functions within the framework of some basic beliefs and choices. These are
not an eternal prison, but they take time and effort to overcome. Sooner or later, a
philosopher gets locked-in by his past commitments, unless he takes great pains to remain
open and inquisitive.






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I cannot say just where – having gleaned this quotation out of context somewhere in the
Internet.
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Or at least, incompletely – being for instance aware of the positive side (e.g. apparent
constancy), but unaware of the negative side (e.g. testing for inconstancy).
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