Page 15 - Logical and Spiritual Reflections

HUME’S PROBLEMS WITH INDUCTION 11

2. The principle of induction

Concerning the uniformity principle, which Hume denies, it is admittedly an idea difficult
to uphold, in the sense that we cannot readily define uniformity or make a generality of it.
We might speak of repetition, of two or more particular things seeming the same to us; but
we are well aware that such regularity does not go on ad infinitum. On the contrary, we
well know that sooner or later, something is bound to be different from the preceding
things, since the world facing us is one of multiplicity.

Therefore, this “principle” may only be regarded as a heuristic idea, a rule of thumb, a
broad but vague practical guideline to reasoning. It makes no specific claims in any given
case. It just reminds us that there are (or seem to us to be) ‘similarities’ in this world of
matter, mind and spirit. It is not intended to deny that there are also (apparent)
‘dissimilarities’. It is obviously not a claim that all is one and the same, a denial of
multiplicity and diversity (in the world of appearances, at least ). To speak of uniformity
14
in Nature is not to imply uniformity of Nature.
We might also ask – can there be a world without any ‘uniformities’? A world of universal
difference, with no two things the same in any respect whatever is unthinkable. Why?
Because to so characterize the world would itself be an appeal to uniformity. A uniformly
non-uniform world is a contradiction in terms. Therefore, we must admit some uniformity
to exist in the world. The world need not be uniform throughout, for the principle of
uniformity to apply. It suffices that some uniformity occurs.

Given this degree of uniformity, however small, we logically can and must talk about
generalization and particularization. There happens to be some ‘uniformities’; therefore,
we have to take them into consideration in our construction of knowledge. The principle of
uniformity is thus not a wacky notion, as Hume seems to imply. It is just a first attempt by
philosophers to explain induction; a first try, but certainly not the last. After that comes
detailed formal treatment of the topic. This proceeds with reference to specifics,
symbolized by X’s and Y’s, and to strict logic.

The uniformity principle is not a generalization of generalization; it is not a statement
guilty of circularity, as some critics contend. So what is it? Simply this: when we come
upon some uniformity in our experience or thought, we may readily assume that
uniformity to continue onward until and unless we find some evidence or reason that
sets a limit to it. Why? Because in such case the assumption of uniformity already has a
basis, whereas the contrary assumption of difference has not or not yet been found to have
any. The generalization has some justification; whereas the particularization has none at
all, it is an arbitrary assertion.

14
I.e. such recognition of pluralism does not at the outset exclude monism. The former may
be true at the superficial phenomenological level, while the latter reigns at the metaphysical level of
ultimate reality.