Page 15 - The Logic of Causation

THE PARADIGM OF CAUSATION 15

directly relevant to the topic under discussion, except that it must be mentioned to stress
that such paradox cannot occur in the context of causation (except to deny causation, of
course).
Therefore, when discussing causation, it is tacitly understood that:

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C is contingent and E is contingent .

That is, each of C, E is possible but unnecessary; likewise, by obversion, for their
negations, each of notC, notE is possible but unnecessary. If any of these positive or
negative terms is by itself necessary or impossible, it is an antecedent or consequent in
valid (and possibly true) propositions, but it is not a cause or effect within the causation
specified. This is, by the way, one difference in meaning between the expressions
cause/effect, and the expressions antecedent/consequent. We shall see, as we deal with
lesser determinations of causation, that their meanings diverge further. All the more so,
when the terms cause/effect are used in other forms of causality.
Furthermore, as above shown with reference to “P” and “Q”, granting the contingencies of
C and E, each of the propositions “If C, then E” and “If notC, then notE” implies the
following possibilities:

The conjunction (C + E) is possible; and
the conjunction (notC + notE) is possible.

All this is hopefully clear to the reader. But we must eventually consider its implications
with reference to statements dealing with lesser determinations of causation or statements
denying causation.

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To avoid any confusion, we should add “in the type of modality characterizing the causal
relation”. But this specification would be incomprehensible to most readers, as the issue of mode of
causation is dealt with in a later chapter.